giving a brief summary of these points. With the remaining tasks the book's performance is not quite so consistent. Sterelny is somewhat reluctant when it comes to flushing out deeply-held background assumptions that the two authors fail to articulate but consistently manifest in their writing. He is also a little shy of stepping outside of the philosophical mode and appealing to clearly influential factors-such as the two authors' clear desire for a high profile and deliberate courting of controversy-which affect deeply the way in which they have presented their ideas. For Sterelny, appealing to such factors is appealing to 'banal psychological explanation ' (p. 123) . But, first, such explanations may offer important insights, and, second, without at least a cursory examination, how is the reader to judge their merits? This said, let me now turn to Sterelny's treatment of specific issues.
Do we best understand evolution by adopting the perspective of the gene or the perspective of the organism? Dawkins promotes the former stance. Gould favours a pluralistic approach: gene, organism, and species selection all have a role to play, with the organism level receiving the most emphasis. The question has spawned a highly complex debate involving very many players. Sterelny aims to simplify, emphasising the key issue that divides Gould and Dawkins. Gould's concern is that natural selection can act only on genes via individual organisms and since, as is widely agreed, the relationship between genes and traits is highly complex, dropping down to the level of the gene will tend to obscure rather than illuminate the action of natural selection. Sterelny draws attention to Gould's tendency to think that 'Dawkins is committed to the idea that there is a stable and simple relation between a particular gene and the characteristics of the organism it is in' (p. 29). But, as Sterelny correctly points out, Dawkins does not need anything nearly so strong as this to make his case.
Sterelny also notes how, since the publication of The Selfish Gene, it has become clear that in embracing gene selection, Dawkins need not reject organism, species, or group selection (pp. 49-52). How clear this has become is, I think, contestable. As well as aiming to explain-in the sense of making intelligible-the origin and persistence of traits, there is also a question about the causal efficacy of different units of selection. It may be fair of Sterelny to set this thorny issue aside, since neither Gould nor Dawkins locates the action here, though it would be useful to have acknowledged this aspect of the debate.
I think Sterelny could do more to take the high ground on this issue. Once the noted mistake on Gould's part is diagnosed, the difference between the two looks like little more than emphasis. Dawkins is right that without appeal to gene selection, it can be difficult or perhaps impossible to explain altruistic traits. That makes gene selection important and, on occasion, worth shouting about. But in explaining very many traits nothing is gained by adopting gene selection over organism selection. And something may be lost since organismlevel changes may in fact be multiply and diversely realised at a genetic level. Given this, a good argument can be made to say that, when looked at coolly, this particular dispute is not substantive.
This argument might have been more available to Sterelny if he were more willing to look at the history and psychology of the dispute. In particular, much of the controversy stirred up by Dawkins's The Selfish Gene was produced by his provocative metaphors and images. The careful reader of Dawkins will note that, most of the time, his metaphors and images are packaged with qualifications. The less careful reader, and that would include much of Gould's audience if not Gould himself, would, in Gould's mind, be in need of some corrective emphasis. This may be a good explanation of the tone and manner of some of Gould's responses to Dawkins. And the misinterpretation of that tone and manner is the sort of thing that sets figures such as Gould and Dawkins at loggerheads.
Dawkins wants to promote and Gould to downplay the power of natural selection as a force that can alter an organism's structure in the face of a whole range of constraints, such as the limits imposed by a basic body plan, those imposed by developmental processes, and the ones imposed by the details of how genes code for traits. It is also true, though he is less forceful on this issue, that Dawkins believes that natural selection has an effect on the large-scale pattern of evolution. Traditionally, natural selection is thought to guarantee only local progress, that is, responsiveness to environmental changes. But two factors lead Dawkins to believe that some sort of global progress is possible: first, the existence of arms races between species-the oft-cited case being the highly complex adaptations of cheetahs and gazelles-and second, the existence of what Maynard Smith and Szathma´ry ([1999] ) have dubbed 'major transitions'-innovations such as the invention of multi-cellular life, the invention of sex, and so forth, which become entrenched and force a direction upon macro-scale evolutionary change.
As with the levels of selection debate, adaptationism-the question of how powerful and pervasive natural selection is when it comes to shaping traitsinvolves many players and much confusion. Sterelny shows clearly how Gould and Dawkins agree on many cases and locates their core disagreement over the issue of how much variation is available for natural selection to work with. Dawkins's hunch is that, in general, variation is in plentiful supply; Gould's bet is that, as often as not, lineages are stuck in cul-de-sacs where the available variation is highly limited. If this is the correct source of the disagreement, then the disagreement is squarely empirical. Sterelny suggests that learning more about how organisms develop may help us settle the dispute, though clearly the most direct source of evidence, history, massively underdetermines either conclusion. When it comes to macro-scale evolutionary patterns, Sterelny again sees the issue as empirical. If we were, in Gould's famous image from It's a Wonderful Life, to re-run the tape of life, Dawkins thinks that the power of natural selection would ensure significant common features in each run. Gould thinks that any prediction beyond 'there'll be a lot of bacteria' is unwarranted.
But, on both the micro-and macro-evolution issue, we can offer different diagnoses for the Dawkins-Gould disagreement. Consider two. The first Sterelny hints at when he notes that 'Dawkins takes the explanation of adaptive complexity to be the central task of evolutionary biology' (p. 59) whereas Gould sees that as just one project of many. Gould is interested in things which, precisely because they are not highly improbable (cf. p. 59), do not need to be explained by reference to natural selection. These may include evolutionary dead-ends and the consequences of meteor impacts, or the rough and ready sorting-falling far short of natural selection-that is associated with species selection (pp. 51-3, 87-8). By and large, Dawkins is not so interested in these things. Once we fully recognise this, much of their dispute can be explained away. A second diagnosis of the source of the disagreement, or so I would argue (and do in Elton [2003] ), is that there is a deep ideological difference between Gould and Dawkins. Dawkins, and even more so his champion Dennett ([1995] ), thinks of the world as replete with design, and hence sees a need to explain the source of this design. Since natural selection is the only explanation of such design, it is self-evident to Dawkins and Dennett that it plays a central role, and one to which all other explanations are secondary. Gould, by contrast, thinks of the world as indeed containing design but also containing much that is either ordered to no special purpose or not ordered at all. Given this deep background belief, it is no surprise that natural selection is less central to Gould's vision of evolutionary biology. I say nothing here about which vision is correct, whether either is coherent, or indeed about any method to decide such issues. But understanding these two different visions does, I believe, give a good deal of insight into the background beliefs that drive the ongoing disputes between Dawkins and Gould.
Sterelny describes Dawkins as 'an old-fashioned science worshipper' (p. 123) and adds that he himself lines up with Dawkins on this front, and not with Gould. For Dawkins, Darwinism shows how materialism can be complete. Without it, the appearance of design is an unexplained mystery that threatens the sovereignty of science; with it, no issue is beyond scientific explanation. Gould, on the other hand, is committed to the idea that 'some important issues are outside of science's scope' and in particular the view that 'science is irrelevant to moral claims' (pp. 124-5). Sterelny's handling of this issue is not good. For although there are decent arguments to be had to support the Dawkins-Sterelny line, they are not aired here. And nothing is said about decent arguments to the contrary. This is not to say that Gould himself is the author of such arguments, only that there are decent arguments for his conclusions. After all, there is a strong tradition in both moral philosophy and the philosophy of mind of accepting both that there are no supernatural forces or agents and also that there are autonomous realms of truth-seeking discourse. Of course, Sterelny may well think that no such views can be made to work, but in a book such as this I think it is his responsibility to at least give them a run for their money.
